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We examine the impact of ambiguity on economic behaviour. We present a rel-
atively non-technical account of ambiguity and show how it may be applied in eco-
nomics. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled.
We show that pessimism has the eﬀect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Motivation
Uncertainty has long been recognized being an important inﬂuence on economic be-
haviour. Knight (1921) made a distinction between risk, i.e., situations where the
probabilities are known, and uncertainty, where probabilities are unknown or imper-
fectly known. In the subsequent literature, situations with unknown probabilities
have been referred to as ambiguity to distinguish them from other kinds of uncer-
tainty. Many current policy questions concern ambiguous risks, for instance, threats
from terrorism and rogue states, the safety of the MMR (measles mumps and rubella)
vaccine and the likely impact of new technologies. A key element of Knight’s theory
was that people diﬀer in their attitudes to ambiguity. The majority of people tend
to avoid ambiguous situations. However a minority of individuals actually appear to
seek ambiguity. In his theory of proﬁt and entrepreneurial activity, Knight argued
that entrepreneurs tend to be individuals who are less ambiguity-averse.
Experimental evidence shows a similar pattern. A majority of experimental sub-
jects behave more cautiously when probabilities are undeﬁned, while a signiﬁcant
minority display the opposite attitude, (see for instance Camerer and Weber (1992)).
Moreover the same individual may be pessimistic in one situation and optimistic in
another. Henceforth we shall refer to such cautious behaviour in face of ambiguity as
pessimism. Ambiguity seeking behaviour will be referred to as optimism.T h e e v i -
dence shows that ambiguity attitudes are distinct from risk attitudes, Cohen, Jaﬀray,
and Said (1985). Individuals may be risk-averse and ambiguity-loving and vice-versa.
This paper aims to present a relatively accessible exposition of recent develop-
ments in the theory of uncertainty in the Knightian sense. In particular we study the
impact of ambiguity in games. Players may react to ambiguity in a pessimistic way
by putting more weight on the worst outcome of any possible course of action than
2an expected utility maximiser would. Alternatively, like Knight’s entrepreneurs, they
may react optimistically to ambiguity and over-weight the best outcome. The paper
makes a number of new contributions. One of these is that the previous literature
focused on ambiguity-aversion, while we allow for the possibility that some individu-
als may be ambiguity-seeking. In addition, the paper discusses new applications and
presents some comparative static results on the impact of ambiguity. Speciﬁcally we
consider the impact of ambiguity in some familiar models from industrial organisa-
tion. In a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and constant marginal cost, the
worst outcome would be perceived as a rival producing a large quantity. Under these
assumptions, Cournot oligopoly is a game of strategic substitutes. Hence pessimism
has the eﬀect of reducing the perceived marginal beneﬁt of producing more and so
reduces the equilibrium output. This raises proﬁts but reduces consumer surplus. In
contrast, in Bertrand competition, a bad outcome would be perceived as rival ﬁrms
charging a low price. Typically there is strategic complementarity in Bertrand mod-
els. In this case pessimism will reduce the incentive for any given ﬁrm to increase
its price and hence will also reduce the equilibrium price. In both oligopoly models
optimism has the opposite eﬀect.
In these models, there is scope for strategic delegation. In both Bertrand and
Cournot oligopoly we show that it is desirable for the owner of a ﬁrm to delegate
decision-making to a manager who is more optimistic than (s)he is. This is in contrast
to the so-called ‘Dutch Book’ arguments, see Green (1987) or Freedman and Purves
(1969). In a typical version of the Dutch Book argument, there is a book-maker and
an outsider. It is argued that the book-maker will lose money for certain if (s)he
have does not have expected utility preferences. However these models are rather
stylised. Often the book-maker is not allowed to consider the impact of his choices
on the outsider’s behaviour. In contrast, we show that optimistic behaviour may be
an advantage in some standard economic models.
3We believe that ambiguity will have an important impact in other social sciences
as well as economics. For instance, environmental risks are often ambiguous due to
limited knowledge of the relevant science and because outcomes will only be seen many
decades from now. The eﬀects of global warming and the environmental impact of
GM crops are two examples. To illustrate the possibilities we consider an application
to peace-making in section 5. We ﬁnd that ambiguity-attitudes can be an important
determinant of the success or failure of a peace process.
1.2 Background
For several decades, subjective expected utility (henceforth SEU) by Savage (1954)
appeared to have rendered the distinction between risk and ambiguity obsolete. In
this theory, individuals faced with uncertainty behave as if they held beliefs that can
be represented by a subjective probability distribution. Hence, from an analytical
point of view, there was little distinction between risk and ambiguity.
However early evidence by Ellsberg (1961) suggests that beliefs cannot be repre-
sented by conventional probabilities. Systematic laboratory experiments have con-
ﬁrmed Ellsberg’s conjecture, Camerer and Weber (1992). Moreover, experimental
work, e.g., by Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), sug-
gests that decision-makers distort their beliefs in a predictable way. One of the best
supported experimental results is that individuals react diﬀerently according to the
source of uncertainty. In particular, they behave much more cautiously in circum-
stances, which are in some sense unfamiliar, Kilka and Weber (1998). The evidence
appears to indicate that decision makers overweight unlikely events associated with
bad outcomes.1
Despite the experimental evidence, SEU proved to be a successful modelling tool.
Important insights were obtained from the distinction between risk preferences and
1Psychologists attribute such ambiguity-aversion to the categorical distinction individuals make
between impossibility, possibility and certainty. Tversky and Wakker (1995) and Wakker (2001)
provide further references for this evidence.
4beliefs, which can be made in this approach. The economics of insurance and in-
formation could be developed in this context. It is desirable to develop a theory of
ambiguity, which was equally suitable for application.
The inconsistencies between Savages’s theory and empirically observed behaviour
have stimulated eﬀorts for alternative theories. In our opinion, one of the most
promising of these is Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU), which involves rep-
resenting individuals’ beliefs by non-additive probabilities (or capacities), see Schmei-
dler (1989). In this theory, individuals maximise the expected value of a utility
function with respect to a non-additive belief, (the expectation is expressed as a
Choquet integral, Choquet (1953-4)). CEU is a generalization of subjective expected
utility. It has the advantage that it maintains the separation of beliefs and outcome
evaluation, which makes the theory easier to apply in economics.
We restrict attention to a special case, where preferences may be represented as
a weighted average of the expected utility, the maximum utility and the minimum
utility. This implies that preferences can be represented as choosing an act a to
maximise:
λM (a)+γm(a)+( 1− γ − λ)Eπu(a), (1)
where M (a)( r e s p . m(a)) denotes the maximum (resp. minimum) utility of act a
and denotes Eπu(a) the expected utility of act a. In this case the decision-maker
maximises a weighted average of the minimum, the maximum and the mean pay-oﬀs.
1.3 Games with Ambiguity
So far ambiguity has been discussed mainly in regard to exogenous uncertainty. In
economics, uncertainty often concerns the behaviour of others. This is usually mod-
elled by Nash equilibrium. In this paper we use an alternative solution concept to
model ambiguity in games. There are two main modiﬁcations to Nash equilibrium.
Firstly players have CEU preferences rather than SEU preferences. Secondly a player
5may perceive some ambiguity about whether or not his/her opponents play best re-
sponses.
In addition to reducing mathematical complexity, the preferences described by
equation (1) have the advantage of providing an intuitive representation of behaviour
in the presence of ambiguity. This enables us to study how equilibrium behaviour
varies with changes in ambiguity or attitudes to ambiguity. Working with these
preferences is almost as easy as with expected utility theory. The theory is intuitive
and can explain some puzzles of the traditional theory. Most importantly, it allows us
to study the impact of ambiguity in economic models, an analysis which is impossible
with expected utility theory. Despite such advantages, we believe that the success
of the model will ultimately depend on its ability to provide new explanations for
economic phenomena.
Organisation of the Paper Section 2 describes how to model individual be-
haviour in the presence of ambiguity. Then in section 3 we discuss a solution concept
for games, which allows for the possibility that the behaviour of other players may
be perceived to be ambiguous. In section 4 we demonstrate possible economic ap-
plications by applying these ideas to oligopoly models. Non-economic applications
are demonstrated by the model of peace-making in section 5. Some more general
results concerning the comparative statics of ambiguity are presented in section 6
and section 7 contains our conclusions. The appendix contains proofs of those results
not proved in the text.
2 Modelling Ambiguity
In this section we explain how ambiguity can be modelled by non-additive beliefs.
We present the concepts of a neo-capacity (non-additive belief) and of the Choquet
integral. This enables to represent preferences as an ‘expectation’ with respect to a
6possibly non-additive belief.
2.1 Games
In this paper we shall consider the impact of ambiguity on behaviour in games.
Here, ambiguity concerns the possible play of one’s opponents. Consider a game
Γ =( I,(Si,u i)i∈I)w i t ht w op l a y e r sI = {1,2}, where each player’s strategy set
Si ⊆ R is a closed and bounded interval. Economic examples often deal with quan-
tities and prices. Hence, for most purposes, it is suﬃcient to assume that each agent
chooses a real number. (Extensions to more complex strategy sets are straightfor-
ward.) The pay-oﬀ function of individual i denoted by ui(si,s −i)i sa s s u m e dt ob e
concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.2 The following notational conventions
will be maintained throughout this paper. The set of strategy combinations will be
denoted by S = S1 × S2. A typical strategy combination s ∈ S can be decomposed
into the strategy si of player i and the strategy combination of the opposing player
s−i,s=( si,s −i). The set of strategy combinations of player i’s opponent is denoted
by S−i.
2.2 Non-Additive Beliefs and Expectations
Consider an economic agent whose proﬁt may depend in part on the behaviour of
rivals. We shall represent individuals’ beliefs by capacities. A capacity plays a
similar role to a subjective probability in SEU. For most of this paper we shall conﬁne
attention to neo-capacities, deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let γ,λ be real numbers such that 0 <γ6 1,0 <λ6 1−γ, deﬁne a
neo-capacity ν by ν (A)=λ+(1− λ − γ)π(A),∅ $ A $ S−i;ν (∅)=0 ,ν(S−i)=1 .3
2In most economic applications these assumptions are satisﬁed or can be relaxed in obvious ways.
For instance, if strategies are multi-dimensional, it is suﬃcient to require that the strategy set is a
closed and bounded subset of R
n. This ensures that maxima or minima exist. Extensions to more
than two players are possible but would introduce technical complications concerning the product
capacity, see Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and Eichberger and Kelsey (2002).
3Neo is an abbreviation for Non-extremal outcome additive. Neo-capacities are axiomatised in
7Neo-capacities provide a useful example. We say that a neo-capacity is optimistic
if γ =0 , pessimistic if λ =0 . If γ = λ =0 , a neo-capacity is additive, which implies
that for all events A,B, A ∩ B = ∅,ν (A ∪ B)=ν(A)+ν(B). An additive capacity
is a conventional probability distribution. Probability distributions, represent very
precise beliefs.
As in standard decision theory, one wishes to assign an expected value to acts,
which a decision-maker may choose. Let u, be a utility function which represents
the decision-makers’ pay-oﬀs as a function of the acts of his/her opponents. An
expectation of u with respect to a capacity ν, can be deﬁned by the Choquet integral,
which allows optimistic and/or pessimistic responses to uncertainty by over-weighting
good and/or bad outcomes.4
Deﬁnition 2.2 The Choquet expected value of the utility function,u i : S−i → R with
respect to the neo-capacity ν = λ +( 1− λ − γ)π is given by:
Z
ui (si,s −i)dν = λMi (si)+γmi (si)+( 1− γ − λ) · Eπui (si,s −i), (2)
where Eπui (si,·) denotes the expected utility of ui with respect to the probability distri-
bution π on S−i and Mi (si)=m a x s∈S−i ui (si,s −i) and mi (si)=m i n s∈S−i ui (si,s −i).
In this case, the Choquet integral is a weighted average of the minimum the max-
imum and the mean pay-oﬀs. There is experimental evidence that preferences have
this form see Lopes (1987).5 Intuitively a neo capacity describes a situation in which
the individual believes the likelihood of events is described by the additive probability
distribution π. However (s)he lacks conﬁdence in this belief. In part (s)he reacts to
Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2002).
4Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler (1989) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) provide axiomatisations for CEU
preferences. Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Wakker (2001) characterise capacities representing
ambiguity-averse or pessimistic attitudes of a decision maker. There is also a closely related literature
which represents beliefs as sets of conventional probability distributions, see Bewley (1986), Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989), Kelsey (1994).
5Such preferences have been axiomatised in the context of risk by Cohen (1992).
8this in an optimistic way measured by λ and in part the reaction is pessimistic, mea-
sured by γ. We shall assume that all individuals have CEU preferences and beliefs,
which can be represented by a neo capacity. The following examples relate CEU to
some more familiar decision rules:
1. If λ =0 , preferences have the maximin form and are extremely pessimistic;
2. If γ =0 , preferences exhibit the maximal degree of optimism;
3. If γ+λ = 1 these preferences coincide with the Hurwicz criterion, (see Hurwicz
(1951)).
The Choquet integral is similar to a conventional expectation since it is a weighted
average of utilities and the weights sum to 1. However the weights are not proba-
bilities but decision weights. Neo-capacities allow us to model optimistic or pes-
simistic individuals according to the decision weights which they apply to outcomes.
T h eb e s t( r e s p . w o r s t )o u t c o m e ,M (resp. m) gets weight λ +( 1− γ − λ)π(M)
(resp. γ +( 1− γ − λ)π(m)). For any other outcome x the decision weight is
(1 − γ − λ)π (x). The Choquet integral is simply the sum over all outcomes of the act
weighted by these decision weights. For additive capacities, the Choquet integral is
the usual expected value of the act. If good (resp. bad) outcomes are over-weighted,
we may interpret this as optimistic (resp. pessimistic) attitudes towards ambiguity.6
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let ν = λ+(1− λ − γ)π be a neo-capacity. We deﬁne the degree of
optimism (resp. pessimism) of ν by λ(ν)=λ, (resp. γ (ν)=γ).
One can interpret the additive part of a neo-capacity π as the decision-maker’s
belief and (1−λ−γ) as the degree of conﬁdence in that belief. In the light of equation
6Sarin and Wakker (1998) provide a detailed discussion of the relationship between decision
weights and capacities. Wakker (2001) provides precise deﬁnitions of optimism and pessimism in
CEU models.
9(2), we refer to the parameter λ (resp. γ)a sdegree of optimism (resp. pessimism).7
If beliefs are represented by conventional probabilities, it is not possible to model
decision-makers who lack conﬁdence in their beliefs. The ability to make this distinc-
tion oﬀers opportunities to analyse the impact of ambiguity and optimism/pessimism
in economic models. For a pessimistic decision maker, the lack of conﬁdence in the
equilibrium prediction is reﬂected by the weight given to the worst outcome. With
neo-capacities, the comparative statics of ambiguity are relatively easy.
If λ = 0, then preferences may be represented on the form a < b ⇔ minp∈C Epu(a) >
minp∈C Epu(b), where C is a set of conventional additive probabilities. We believe
this formula is intuitive. When a decision-maker does not know the true probability
(s)he considers a set of probabilities to be possible. He/she behaves cautiously and
evaluates any course of action by the least favourable probability distribution. This
small deviation from subjective probabilities allows us to capture the certainty eﬀect,
which is consistently observed in experimental work (Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and
Kilka and Weber (1998)).
Deﬁnition 2.4 The support of the neo-capacity ν (A)=λ +( 1− λ − γ)π (A), is
deﬁned by suppν = suppπ.8
The support represents the set of states which the decision-maker ‘believes’ in.
We interpret the neo-capacity ν as representing a situation where the decision-maker
‘believes’ in the additive probability distribution π but lacks conﬁdence in this belief.
It thus seems intuitive that the support of ν should coincide with the support of π.
7Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) provide alternative concepts of ambiguity
aversion. In the case of CEU, Ghirardato and Marinacci take additive capacities as the benchmark
case of no ambiguity-aversion, while Epstein argues for capacities which are monotone transforma-
tions of an additive probability (probabilistic sophistication) as the relevant benchmark. This implies
that a convex and increasing transformation of an additive probability is interpreted as ambiguity-
aversion by Ghirardato and Marinacci and as probabilistic risk-aversion by Epstein. We cannot
resolve this controversy in this paper. We mainly consider pure equilibria of games, in which case
the two deﬁnitions agree.
8T h e r eh a v eb e e nan u m b e ro fd e ﬁnitions of support proposed for convex capacities. See Ryan
(1997) for a full discussion. If λ = 0 the neo-capacity is convex. This deﬁnition of support coincides
with most of the proposed deﬁnitions in this case.
10This is equivalent to the usual deﬁnition of a support, if the capacity is additive.
However, this does not rule out that there may be strategy combinations outside
the support, which inﬂuence a player’s choice. If beliefs are represented by a neo-
capacity then the best and worst outcome will inﬂuence choice in addition to members
of the support. The support of a neo-capacity is itself an ambiguous event, since
ν (suppν)+ν (¬suppν)=1+λ − γ, which is not in general equal to 1. This is an
important part of our model of ambiguity.
2.3 More General Models of Ambiguity
Representing preferences by a Choquet integral with respect to a neo-capacity is a
special case of a decision theory due to Schmeidler (1989). In this theory beliefs are
represented by a more general class of capacities. This implies that, a decision-maker
will over-weight a number of good and bad outcomes compared to an expected utility
maximiser. The eﬀect of restricting attention to neo-capacities is that only the best
and worst outcomes are over-weighted.
There are two features of the general CEU model, which make it diﬃcult to
apply. Firstly it can be mathematically complex. Secondly there are too many free
parameters. A capacity on a set with n elements involves 2n parameters, while n−1
parameters will describe a probability distribution on the same set. For this reason we
have chosen to focus on the case where beliefs may be represented by neo-capacities
which can be described by n +1n u m be r s .
3 Strategic Games with Ambiguity
3.1 Equilibrium
In this section we present a model of the impact of ambiguity in games. In this
context, uncertainty concerns the possible play of one’s opponents. Consider an
11arbitrary player i who is uncertain about his/her opponent’s choice of strategy. If
player i’s beliefs are modelled by a neo-capacity νi on S−i with an additive probability
distribution πi, degree of optimism λi and degree of pessimism γi, then the payoﬀ
function is the Choquet integral,
Vi (si;πi,λ i,γi)=λimi (si)+γiMi (si)+( 1− λi − γi) ·
Z
ui(si,s −i) dπi(s−i). (1)
Deﬁnition 3.1 A pair of neo-capacities hν∗
1,ν∗
2i is an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity
(EUA) if: suppν∗




, for i =1 ,2.
In equilibrium, each individual plays a best response given his/her beliefs. (Since
utility is assumed to be concave the ﬁrst order condition is suﬃcient for s∗
i to be a best
response.) Players ‘believe’ that their opponent will play best responses. However
they lack conﬁdence in this belief. This lack of conﬁdence is reﬂected in the fact
that the support of the capacity is an ambiguous event. They may respond to this
lack of conﬁdence in an optimistic way by over-weighting the best outcome, or in a
pessimistic way by over-weighting the worst outcome. This notion of equilibrium is
in the spirit of that suggested by Dow and Werlang (1994).9
The similarity of an EUA with a standard Nash equilibrium is obvious. Indeed, for
no ambiguity, λi = γi =0f o ra l li ∈ I,this solution concept would coincide with Nash
equilibrium. If beliefs are strictly non-additive then, whether or not opponents play
best responses, is itself an ambiguous event. Thus the possibility that particularly
good or bad strategies may be played, could aﬀect the strategy choice of a player.
In economics, equilibria are usually interpreted as situations where, given their
beliefs, agents have no incentive to change their strategy and these beliefs are con-
sistent with observations about the opponents’ behaviour. The standard solution
concept, Nash equilibrium has been characterised by two assumptions:
9It is more general, since unlike the earlier paper we allow for optimistic as well as pessimistic
preferences. Dow and Werlang (1994) was also more general since they allowed equilibrium beliefs
to be an arbitrary convex capacity.
12• players are assumed to be rational in the sense of maximizing their objective
functions by independently choosing a strategy given their beliefs about the
opponents’ behaviour,
• beliefs about behaviour have to be consistent with opponents’ actual behaviour.
Mostly one assumes that actual behaviour can be observed and in the case of mixed
strategies, situations are repetitive enough so that one can infer the mixed strategies
played from the frequency of actual choices. The assumption of consistency of beliefs
and observations is embodied in the equilibrium requirement that beliefs coincide
with actual behaviour.
If beliefs are strictly non-additive, then behaviour, whether in pure or mixed
strategies, simply cannot coincide with the strategies played, since there are no non-
additive randomising devices. Thus a weaker notion of consistency is desirable. We
will assume that, in equilibrium, players will focus their beliefs on strategies which
are best responses. The support of a capacity, suppνi, is the set of strategies on
which beliefs are focused. Our equilibrium concept adopts a notion of consistency
suitable for modelling ambiguity.10
We deﬁne an equilibrium in terms of non-additive beliefs (ν∗
1,ν∗
2). Equilibrium
strategies are given by the supports of the capacities, which are required to be best
responses. If these are unique, we have a pure equilibrium. If there are several
strategies, which a player considers as equal best, then any combination of these
is possible in equilibrium. For example in Matching Pennies,a n yc o m b i n a t i o no f
“heads” and “tails” will represent equilibrium behaviour as long as both players
do not believe that the opponent would favour a particular choice. If there is no
ambiguity, then the equilibrium deﬁnition (3.1) speciﬁes a set of independent additive
10Lo (1996) and Marinacci (2000) present alternative equilibrium deﬁnitions based on diﬀerent
notions of support. This has the eﬀect of imposing diﬀerent consistency requirements. In Lo’s
deﬁnition of equilibrium players do not perceive ambiguity about whether their opponents play
best responses. This results in a solution concept which does not diﬀer substantially from Nash
equilibrium.
13probability distributions, which are the mixed strategies of a Nash equilibrium.
In economic applications, players’ strategy sets are mostly continuous variables,
such as prices, quantities and investment expenditures. In such situations, pure
equilibria exist. Even when players’ beliefs are represented by conventional subjective
probabilities there are problems with the interpretation of mixed equilibria.11 Hence,
we shall not consider mixed strategies in the present paper. The following result
demonstrates the existence of pure equilibria.
Proposition 3.1 If, for all players i ∈ I,the strategy sets Si are closed, bounded and
convex, and if the payoﬀ functions ui(si,s −i) are continuous in s and quasi-concave
in each player’s own strategy si, then there exists an Equilibrium under Ambiguity
(EUA) in pure strategies.
In the present paper, we restrict attention to neo capacities νi (A)=
λi +( 1− λi − γi)πi (A), which implies, suppν∗
i = suppπi. Hence, the support con-
tains all strategy combinations which are in the support of its additive part, πi, which
we interpret as beliefs. In games, one can determine πi, endogenously as the predic-
tion of the players from the knowledge of the game structure and the preferences of
others. In contrast. we treat the degrees of optimism, λi and pessimism, γi as ex-
ogenous. Unlike standard Nash equilibrium however, players may not have complete
trust in their predictions. This is illustrated by the following example .
Example 1 There are two players, an incumbent monopolist, M, and an entrant, E.
If the entrant chooses not to enter, ne, (s)he will receive payoﬀ 0 and the incumbent
will receive the monopoly proﬁts M. If the entrant enters the market, e,t h em o n o p o l i s t
has the choice of accommodating entry, a or ﬁghting a price war, f. If the incumbent
accommodates entry, both ﬁrms receive the duopoly proﬁt d. Fighting entry causes both
ﬁrms to sustain losses −L. The interaction between the monopolist and the entrant
11For a discussion of the relevance of mixed strategy equilibrium the reader is referred to Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994) .






where m>d>0 and L>0.
There are two Nash equilibria (without ambiguity), ha,ei,a n dhf,nei. In the
ﬁrst, the monopolist accommodates and the entrant enters, while in the second the
monopolist ﬁghts and the entrant stays out. It is common to regard the latter equilib-
rium as less plausible. Once the entrant is in the industry, the monopolist will make
lower proﬁts by ﬁghting than by accommodating. This equilibrium is eliminated by
any standard reﬁnement such as subgame perfection.
Now we shall consider how ambiguity aﬀects this example. We shall assume
that agents are purely pessimistic, i.e. γ>0,λ=0 . When there is ambiguity, we
ﬁnd a new type of equilibrium. In this, the monopolist does not ﬁght. However
entry does not occur because the entrant is pessimistic and perceives considerable
ambiguity about the incumbent’s behaviour. Consider the following beliefs: νE(a)=
α, νE(f)=0 , L
(d+L) >α>0,νM(e)=0 ,ν M(ne)=β,1 > β>0. These beliefs
show a high degree of pessimism for the entrant. With these beliefs the (Choquet)
expected payoﬀ of the monopolist is given by:
V M (a)=mβ + d(1 − β),V M (f)=mβ − L(1 − β). (3)
Hence, a is a best response for the monopolist. If β<1, then f is not a best response
for the monopolist. Since this holds for all β<1, even small amounts of ambiguity-
15aversion are capable of eliminating non-credible threats.12 The (Choquet) expected
utility of the entrant is given by, V E (e)=dα−L(1 − α),V E (ne)=0 . Thus ne is





We interpret this as saying the entrant will not enter if (s)he is suﬃciently ambiguity-
averse. Equation (4) says that entry is more likely, the higher are the proﬁts from
successful entry d and the lower are the losses from a price war, L. In Nash equilib-
rium, entry is independent of these factors provided d and L are both positive. In
our opinion, it is not implausible that these factors would aﬀect the outcome.
The case of large ambiguity-aversion in Example 1, shows how non-Nash be-
haviour can arise in EUA. The entrant considers it more likely that the incumbent
will accommodate entry and this belief is sustained in equilibrium. It is possible that
such a decision might be aﬀected by ambiguity, since a ﬁrm will usually have much
less information about an industry in which it does not already have a presence. In
practice, entry is likely to entail considerable expenditure before any returns are re-
ceived. By deﬁnition the entrant is not already in the industry. Thus (s)he may face
some considerable ambiguity about relevant variables, in particular the behaviour of
the incumbent. It is not implausible that entrants might react by behaving cautiously
and not entering even if they do not expect the incumbent to ﬁght a price war.
In standard Nash theory, the assumption that the other player will be more likely
to play a, implies that it is optimal to play e, which yields the higher payoﬀ of d.
This need not be the case in an EUA, if the entrant is suﬃciently ambiguity-averse.
Clearly, the possibility that the monopolist might ﬁght entry, an event which is not
in the support of the belief, inﬂuences the equilibrium outcome. Such behaviour
is not implausible when players perceive ambiguity. If the entrant thinks that the
12This is true more generally see, Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Proposition 5.1.
16monopolist will be cautious and accommodate, (s)he may still not be bold enough,
to enter, since a misjudgment will earn him/her an outcome of −L.
Our intuition suggests that (ne,a) is not an implausible way to behave. We
suspect, however, that the degree of ambiguity-aversion depends upon observations.
As evidence builds up that the opponent plays a (or f respectively), conﬁdence may
grow and choosing e (ne) may become more likely. With a support notion, which
insists that strategy combinations outside the support do not aﬀect behaviour, (ne,a)
can never be an equilibrium. It seems to us an advantage of EUA, that it opens the
possibility to model such testable hypothesis.
4 Oligopoly Models
In this section, we shall present some examples of how the techniques described
in previous sections, can be used to examine the eﬀect of ambiguity on economic
behaviour. These examples will illustrate that the consequences of ambiguity can be
examined without technical sophistication.
4.1 Cournot Oligopoly
4.1.1 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
First we consider a symmetric Cournot duopoly, where ﬁrms produce homogenous
products and choose quantities as their strategic variable. We will show that, in this
case, optimism increases competition because it induces more aggressive behaviour.
Pessimism will, in general, have the opposite eﬀect.
There are 2 ﬁrms,i=1 ,2, which compete in quantities. Assume that ﬁrm i faces
the linear inverse demand curve Pi(xi,x j)=m a x {1 − xi − xj,0}. We shall assume
that each ﬁrm can produce at constant marginal cost equal to c. Firm i chooses the
quantity it wants to supply, xi, from the interval [0, 1]. If beliefs are represented by
17neo-capacities, a ﬁrm over-weights the best and worst outcomes. We assume that
ﬁrm i perceives the worst scenario to be a situation, where its rival dumps a large
quantity on the market, driving the price down to zero. The ﬁrm’s perceived best
outcome is assumed to be where the rival produces zero output and the ﬁrm is a
monopolist. Under these assumptions ﬁrm i’s (Choquet) expected proﬁti s :
Πi = λxi (1 − xi)+( 1− γ − λ)xi [1 − xj − xi] − cxi. (5)
A possible criticism of this model is that the choice of the best and the worst outcome
is arbitrary. However our results do not depend crucially on these assumptions. All
that is required is that the best (resp. worst) outcome be below (resp. above) the
Nash equilibrium output.13
The ﬁrst order condition for maximising ﬁrm 1’s proﬁti s ,dΠ1
dx1 = λ1 (1 − 2x1)+
(1 − γ1 − λ1)(1− 2x1 − x2)=c. Hence the reaction function of ﬁrm 1 is given by,
R1 (x2)=
(1 − γ1) − (1 − γ1 − λ1)x2 − c
2(1− γ1)
. (6)
Proposition 4.1 In a symmetric equilibrium where λ1 = λ2 = λ and γ1 = γ2 = γ,
the equilibrium output and price are given by
¯ x =
1 − γ − c
3 − 3γ − λ
, ¯ p =
1 − γ − λ +2 c
3 − 3γ − λ
.





















T h en e x tr e s u l ts h o w st h a ti fﬁrms become more optimistic, (i.e. λ increases)
then equilibrium output will rise. An increase in optimism will increase the weight
13See Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) Proposition 3.1, for a related result which does not depend on
assumptions about the perceived best and worst outcomes.
18the ﬁrm puts on rivals producing a low output. This increases the marginal beneﬁt
of producing more and hence results in an increase in equilibrium output.
Proposition 4.2 The eﬀects of changes in ambiguity attitude on equilibrium in
Cournot oligopoly are as follows:
1. An increase in optimism increases output and decreases prices in equilibrium;
2. If λ<3c, an increase in pessimism reduces equilibrium output and increases
prices.
Proof. By inspection, ¯ x is an increasing function of λ. Since
dp
d¯ x = −2, the equilibrium
price is a decreasing function of λ. The eﬀect of an increase in pessimism on output




(3−3γ−λ)2, which is negative provided λ<3c.
As before,
dp
dγ = −2d¯ x
dγ.
Intuitively more optimism causes a ﬁrm to place more weight on the possibility
that its rival will produce a low output. This increases the marginal proﬁtability of
extra output. Thus the given ﬁrm will produce more and hence the equilibrium output
will rise. This reasoning is not restricted to the speciﬁc demand and cost functions but
will apply whenever Cournot oligopoly is a game of strategic substitutes. In general
o n ew o u l dn o te x p e c tt h ee ﬀect of optimism to be large, hence it seems reasonable
to assume λ<3c, in which case an increase in pessimism would decrease equilibrium
output. Likewise an increase in pessimism causes ﬁrms to place more weight on the
possibility that a rival will produce a high output. This reduces the marginal beneﬁt
of producing more and hence tends to decrease equilibrium strategies.14
Corollary 4.1 Assume ¯ x>1
4 (1 − c), then:
1. An increase in optimism decreases equilibrium proﬁts,
14However in this case there is an opposing eﬀect. Assume cost is zero, by equation (5) the
objective function of ﬁrm i is cardinally equivalent to ˜ Πi =
λ
1−γxi (1 − xi)+
(1−γ−λ)
1−γ xi [1 − xj − xi].
Increasing γ increases the weight placed on the monopoly proﬁts in this expression and hence increases
the output. A similar eﬀect applies when cost is low but not zero i.e. 3c<λ .
192. If λ<3c, an increase in pessimism increases equilibrium proﬁts.
Proof. Equilibrium proﬁts are given by, π =( p(x(λ)) − c)x(λ), hence
∂Π













∂λ [1 − c − 4¯ x(λ)].
Thus provided ¯ x>1
4 (1 − c)a ni n c r e a s ei nλ decreases proﬁt. The proof of part 2
follows by similar reasoning.
The condition ¯ x>1
4 (1 − c)s a y st h a tt h ee ﬀects of ambiguity are relatively small,
in the sense that they do not induce ﬁrms to produce less than the collusive output.
We would view this as the normal case.
To illustrate these results consider the case where there is no optimism λ =0 . By










Assume that there is an increase in pessimism, γ rises. Then the rhs. of equation
(7) increases. Since the lhs. of equation (7) is decreasing in ¯ x(γ), ¯ x must be a
decreasing function of γ. An increase in pessimism will decrease the quantities in a
symmetric Cournot equilibrium as depicted in Figure 1. As ﬁrms are symmetric,
EUA are intersections of the best response function with the 45-degree line.
Pessimism reduces the amount brought to market. Intuitively, ambiguity makes
a decision-maker cautious about the behaviour of the opponent. By dumping output
onto the market, the rival can drive down the price. If ﬁrms become more concerned
about this possibility, they will reduce output in order to avoid the losses that would
a r i s ei ns u c hac a s e .
Due to the informational requirements, it may be diﬃcult to identify the Nash
equilibrium in an actual market. Hence, deviations may be hard to measure. Indirect
evidence however may be gleaned from some experimental studies. Though the ex-
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Figure 1: Cournot equilibrium and ambiguity
(1999)) found that “more information about behaviour and proﬁts of others yields
more competitive outcomes” (Result 2, p. C89). If ambiguity-aversion reﬂects a
lack of conﬁdence in one’s information about the opponent, this may provide indirect
evidence for ambiguity-aversion as a reason for reduced competition.
Traditionally, it has been suspected that oligopolies are prone to informal collusive
arrangements. Scherer (1970) provides many examples from anti-trust cases. The
presumption of regulators that oligopolists collude, suggests that output is, at least
sometimes, below the Cournot level without clear evidence of collusion. Ambiguity
may oﬀer an alternative and as yet unexplored explanation for why competition may
be less ﬁerce in Cournot-style oligopoly than predicted by Nash equilibrium.
214.1.2 Strategic Delegation
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw es h o wt h a ti tm a yb ep r o ﬁtable to delegate decision-making to a
manager who is more optimistic than the owner of the ﬁrm. This allows the owner to
commit to producing a larger output, which is advantageous in a game of strategic
substitutes.
Assume that ﬁr m1h a sap r o ﬁt maximising owner who is ambiguity neutral, i.e.
has additive beliefs. The owner hires a manager to operate the ﬁrm on his/her behalf.
The owner pays him a wage, which is fraction α of ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt. The manager has
CEU preferences and has beliefs represented by a neo-capacity. The owner chooses
the manager to maximise his/her proﬁt. Firm 2 is a conventional proﬁt maximising
ﬁrm. The following result ﬁnds the levels of optimism, λ1 and pessimism, γ1,w h i c h
are optimal for the owner of ﬁrm 1.
Proposition 4.3 The proﬁt maximising levels of λ1 and γ1 satisfy




Proof. Proﬁt is maximised where the equilibrium output of ﬁrm 1 is equal to that of
a Stackleberg leader which is 1




2 (1 − c). Cross multiplying we obtain, 2(1 − γ1 + λ1) − 2(1+γ1 + λ1)c
=( 1− c)(3(1− γ1)+λ1), or λ1 (2 − 2c)−2γ1−2γ1c+2(1− c)=3( 1− γ1)(1− c)+
λ1 (1 − c). Hence λ1 (1 − c)=3( 1− γ1)(1− c) −2(1− c)+2 γ1 (1 + c), from which
the result follows.
To understand this result it is useful to consider the special case where γ1 =0 .
Then equation (8) says λ1 =1 , which implies that the manager will assign weight
one to the possibility that the opponents will produce zero output and will himself
produce the monopoly output. This is desirable, since in this example, the monopoly
output coincides with the output of a Stackleberg leader, which is the most proﬁtable
22output. Of course it is very unlikely that a manager would assign decision-weight one
to the possibility that the opponents will produce zero output. However it remains
true that proﬁt can be raised by delegating to a manager who is more optimistic
than the owner.15 This suggests one reason why we might expect to see ambiguity-
loving individuals. Such attitudes may increase an individual’s income. In strategic
interactions it may well not be in an individual’s interest to follow the Savage axioms.
4.2 Bertrand Oligopoly
We shall now consider price (Bertrand) competition. In this case, ambiguity attitudes
have the opposite eﬀect. More pessimism increases competition by inducing ﬁrms to
charge lower prices.
4.2.1 Equilibria without Ambiguity
Consider 2 ﬁrms producing heterogeneous goods which are close (but not perfect)
substitutes. Firm i can produce at constant marginal and average cost, k>0. Firm
i charges price pi for its output. We assume that ﬁrm i faces a linear demand curve:
Di(pi,p j)=m a x {0,a+ bpj − cpi},a , b , c > 0,a > k,c > b. The following result
describes the equilibrium when ﬁrms choose prices simultaneously.
Proposition 4.4 In Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand model,
1. the reaction function of ﬁrm i is given by
pi (pj)=
a + bpj + ck
2c
, (9)
2. both ﬁrms charge a price equal to, ˆ p = a+ck
2c−b.
15This result has found the value of λ1, which will maximises the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm. However from
the point of view of the owner, there is an additional advantage of hiring an optimistic owner. The
more optimistic the owner the lower the value of α needed to induce the manager to work. This
second eﬀect also implies that it is advantageous to hire an optimistic manager.
23Proof. The proﬁts of ﬁrm i are given by, Πi =( pi − k)(a + bpj − cpi). The ﬁrst
order condition for proﬁt maximisation is: ∂Πi
∂pi =( a + bpj − cpi) − c(pi − k)=0 ,
from which part (1) follows. Let ˆ p denote the level of price charged by both ﬁrms in
a symmetric Nash equilibrium then ˆ p =
a+bˆ p+ck
2c , which implies part (2).
Now suppose that ﬁrm 1 is a price leader and must set price ﬁrst. Firm 2 then
observes the price set by ﬁrm 1 and chooses its own price to maximise proﬁt.
Proposition 4.5 If ﬁrm 1 is a price leader its optimal price is given by:
p1 =






With price leadership, ﬁrm 1 sets a price above the Bertrand equilibrium level
since it takes into account the fact that when it raises price, this causes ﬁrm 2 to
raise price as well. In this game there is a second mover advantage. Firm 2 makes
higher proﬁts since it can slightly undercut ﬁrm 1’s price.
4.2.2 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
Now assume that each ﬁrm perceives its rival’s behaviour as ambiguous and has be-
liefs represented by neo-capacities. We assume that each ﬁrm perceives the worst
case to be where its rival reduces price to marginal cost. Hence we assume, a ﬁrm’s
strategy set is the interval [k,K]f o rs o m es u ﬃciently high K. We shall assume the
best case is perceived to be where the rival ﬁrm sets price equal to K. Given this
interpretation, it seems reasonable to require that K be above the Nash equilib-
rium price, i.e. K>
(a+ck)
(2c−b). We require a + bk − cK > 0 to ensure that demand is
positive at all quantities in the ﬁrms’ strategy sets. With these assumptions the (Cho-
quet) expected proﬁto fﬁrm i becomes: Πi =( 1− γi − λi)(pi − k)(a + bpj − cpi)+
γi (pi − k)(a + bk − cpi)+λi (pi − k)(a + bK − cpi). Simplifying
Πi =( pi − k)(a − cpi)+(pi − k)b[(1 − γi − λi)pj + γik + λiK]. The ﬁrst-order con-
24dition for proﬁt maximisation is: ∂Πi
∂pi = a−cpi−c(pi − k)+b[(1 − γi − λi)pj + γik + λiK]=
0. Thus ﬁrm i’s reaction function is given by
ρi (pj)=
a + b[(1 − γi − λi)pj + γik + λiK]+ck
2c
. (10)
Equation (10) deﬁnes a non-singular system of linear equations, which implies that
the Bertrand equilibrium is unique. Since K > pj > k, an increase in λi (resp. γi)
will shift ﬁrm i’s reaction curve up (resp. down) and hence increase (resp. decrease)
the equilibrium price. The price of ﬁrm j will also increase, since reaction curves
slope upwards. Consider ﬁrm 1. An increase in optimism causes it to place more
weight on good outcomes. In this context, a good outcome would be ﬁrm 2 charging
a high price. Since the model exhibits strategic complementarity this gives ﬁrm 1
an incentive to increase its price. This discussion is summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.6 In Bertrand oligopoly an increase in optimism (resp. pessimism)
of ﬁrm i causes both ﬁrms to set higher (resp. lower) prices in equilibrium.
T h ec a s eo ft w oﬁrms with symmetric linear demand functions is illustrated in
ﬁgure 2. An increase in pessimism causes the reaction curve to shift down and the
slope to decrease. Firms have their own markets in which to react to the other’s
price. Uncertainty about the other price is equivalent to uncertainty about a ﬁrm’s
own demand. The lower a given ﬁrm sets the price, the smaller the market the
opponents will face. Firms’ concern about low demand in their respective market,
provides an incentive for charging lower prices than in a conventional (Bertrand)
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Figure 2: Bertrand equilibrium and uncertainty
4.2.3 Strategic Delegation
Equation (10) shows that an increase in λi will increase the equilibrium prices of
both ﬁrms. In Bertrand oligopoly, a given ﬁrm can gain a strategic advantage by
committing to price above the equilibrium level, see Fershtman and Judd (1987).
This causes rivals to raise their prices, which gives the ﬁrst ﬁrm an indirect beneﬁt
since its proﬁts are higher the greater the prices of its rivals. Our results show that,
appointing an optimistic manager would be a way to commit to a price above the
Nash equilibrium level. Hence an optimistic manager will make more proﬁtt h a na n
expected utility maximiser.
To illustrate the possibilities for strategic delegation we consider an speciﬁcf o r m
26for the demand function.
Example 2 Assume a = c =2and b =1 , i.e. D(pi,p j)=2+pj − 2pi, for i =1 ,2.
By Propositions 4.4 and 4.5, the Nash equilibrium price is, ˆ p = 2
3 + 2
3k, while a price





14 . We assume
that ﬁrm 2 is a conventional proﬁt maximising ﬁrm. C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eﬁrm
1 has ambiguity neutral owners, who delegate decision making to a manager, whose
beliefs are represented by a neo-capacity. In this case we can show that γ1 =0 ,λ 1 =
10−5k
56K−38−37k, are proﬁt-maximising levels of λ1 and γ. 16
The discussion of strategic delegation assumes that the ambiguity attitude of the
manager is observable. Managers do make public speeches and reports, which could
be used to reveal their ambiguity attitude. Many managers do appear to cultivate
an optimistic view of their ﬁrm’s performance. This could, in part, be motivated by
strategic considerations.
In both Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly proﬁts can be increased above the Nash
equilibrium level by employing an optimistic manager. This is unusual as most com-
parative static results are reversed when one moves from Cournot to Bertrand com-
petition.
5P e a c e - m a k i n g
We believe that formal modelling of ambiguity will aid the understanding of a number
of problems in the social sciences. To illustrate this point, we next consider a model
of a peace-making.
5.1 Motivation for Ambiguity in Conﬂict Situations
Consider the following stylised facts about peace-making between Israel and the Pales-
tinians.
16T h i sc l a i mi sp r o v e di nL e m m aA . 2i nt h ea p p e n d i x .
271. “It takes two parties for peace but only one for war.”
2. “We don’t know what to believe. We oﬀered them so much in the negotiations
but they (Palestinians) said ‘no’ and started this terror (Intifada) on us. They
even use the arms we provided to the police force of the Palestinian authority
to shoot us.”
3. “We want peace but...”
Whereas (1) suggests that a player’s marginal beneﬁt of contributing to peace
jumps in the opponent’s contribution to peace, (2) indicates uncertainty about the
opponent’s strategy. Fact (2) may indicate also that peace-making has positive ex-
ternalities, i.e. an increase of one’s peace eﬀort increases the opponent’s beneﬁt. In
the light of fact (3) it seems reasonable to assume that there is a dilemma. The
Palestinian position appears to be not too dissimilar.
War is an inherently ambiguous situation. Even experienced generals admit to
being often surprised by developments. In conﬂict situations such as Northern Ireland
where do probability judgements come from? History provides only limited knowledge
of similar conﬂicts, hence probabilities could not be interpreted as frequencies. It
seems that a Bayesian model would not capture the nature of the conﬂict (stylized
fact 2. “We don’t know what to believe.”).
5.2 A Peace-making Game
Consider two players i =1 ,2 interpreted as the parties involved in the conﬂict. Each
player i chooses a strategy si ∈ Si =[ 0 ,1]. We interpret si =0a sn oe ﬀort, whereas
si = 1 is full eﬀort to peace-making. Higher values of si correspond to greater peace-
making eﬀorts by individual i. Let s =( s1,s 2) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1 ] . W ea s s u m et h a t






2 if s1 < 1o rs2 < 1,0 <ε<1
4,
1, if s1 = s2 =1 .
The beneﬁts from peace making are increasing in the eﬀorts of both parties, hence
there are positive externalities. Avoiding a single terror act by the Palestinians or
the killing one innocent school girl by the Israeli forces, brings an increase in beneﬁt.
The beneﬁt function is convex, which implies there is strategic complementarity in
peace-making. The more eﬀort supplied by the Palestinians the greater the marginal
beneﬁt of peace-making by the Israelis. The discontinuity at h1,1i indicates that
there is a qualitative diﬀerence between peace and a war of very low intensity.
Peace-making can be costly, e.g. in Israel the right wing protests if the government
does not respond forcefully enough to Palestinian terror. Increasing peace-making
eﬀorts may bear the risk of losing some right wing coalition partners and votes. There
is likely to be similar pressures on other parties such as the Palestinian leadership or
the IRA. For simplicity we assume some linear costs csi,c>0. The payoﬀ function
u of either party i =1 ,2 is written
ui (si,s j)=ab(si,s j) − csi,
with a>0, being a real valued parameter weighting the importance of peace in the
payoﬀ function. The game is given by ΓP = h(Si)i=1,2,(ui)i=1,2i.17 Thus peace can
be viewed as a public good produced with increasing returns to scale. The following
result characterises the Nash equilibria of the peace game.
Proposition 5.1 Solutions without ambiguity of the peace-making game ΓP,a r e
characterised as follows:
17This is a symmetric game. One may argue that many conﬂict situations are not symmetric, e.g.
the IRA were ﬁghting both the British army and the protestant paramilitaries. However we do not
believe this simpliﬁcation aﬀects our conclusions qualitatively.
291. if aε > c then full peace-making eﬀort is the strictly dominant strategy for
i =1 ,2;
2. if a(1 − ε) > c > aε then there exist two Nash equilibria in pure strategies
one with full peace-making eﬀort and one where no eﬀort is supplied by either
party;18
3. if c>a (1 − ε) then no eﬀort is the strictly dominant strategy for i =1 ,2.
Case (3) describes a situation where each side views the beneﬁts of peace as
being less than the costs of peace-making, regardless of what the other party does.
Consequently peace is not established. Such a situation would arise if beneﬁts from
peace are small compared to costs of peace-making eﬀorts. This does not seem
a realistic representation of situations such as Israel or Northern Ireland, where it
seems most people perceive peace as worth achieving if possible.
Case (1) is the non-problematic case. Beneﬁts from peace are strictly larger than
the costs. Hence both parties provide full eﬀort and peace is established. Again this
does not appear to be a reasonable model of the world’s conﬂict situations.
Case (2) is the interesting intermediate case. There are substantial beneﬁts from
peace but beneﬁts from intermediate peace-making eﬀorts are not enough to justify
the costs. This seems to ﬁt the circumstances in many potential conﬂict situations.
It corresponds to stylized fact (3). Two Nash equilibria in pure strategies arise, one
in which both parties engage in full peace-making eﬀorts establishing peace and one
in which no eﬀort is made and peace is not achieved.
5.3 Peace-making under Ambiguity
Now we study the impact of ambiguity on the peace-making game. The following
proposition shows more optimism makes a successful peace process more likely. In the
18There exists also a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where parties mix between zero and full
peace-making eﬀort.
30case where Nash equilibrium is not unique, ambiguity can play a role in equilibrium
selection. If the degree of optimism is suﬃciently high, there is a unique equilibrium
in which the peace process succeeds. Pessimism has the opposite eﬀect. If there is
enough pessimism, we can be sure that peace will not be established.
Proposition 5.2 T h ei m p a c to fa m b i g u i t yi nt h ep e a c e - m a k i n gg a m e ,ΓP, is as fol-
lows:
1. If aε > c: any equilibrium under ambiguity involves only the Nash equilibrium
strategy under certainty, i.e. si =1 , i =1 ,2.
2. If a(1 − ε) >c>a ε : any equilibrium under ambiguity involves only strategies
si =1or si =0 , i =1 ,2.M o r e o v e r ,t h e r ee x i s t s¯ λ (resp. ¯ γ) such that if λ > ¯ λ
(resp. γ > ¯ γ)t h e nsi =1(resp. si =0 ) is the unique equilibrium strategy for
i =1 ,2.
3. If c > a(1 − ε): any equilibrium under ambiguity involves only the Nash equi-
librium strategy under certainty, i.e. si =0 , i =1 ,2.
We believe the important part is case (2), which we argued is likely to be the
relevant case when peace-making poses a serious political problem. It is in this case,
that ambiguity makes a diﬀerence. A high degree of pessimism causes peace-making
eﬀorts to break down. On the other hand optimism (or more conﬁdence in the actions
of the other side) can cause the peace-making process to be successful.
This model is far from being the last word on peace-making. There are many fea-
tures such as repeated interaction between the parties, that are completely omitted.
Moreover, it is easy to observe that the process is more complicated since it involves
complex political interactions within each side, not modelled here. This simple model
cannot give precise advice to politicians but perhaps it is helpful for the peace-process
to reduce ambiguity about each others actions and to encourage conﬁdence in the
31peace-making activities of others. Diﬀerences in perceived ambiguity may explain
why, arguably, Northern Ireland has a successful peace process while Palestine does
not. The process of European integration may have served to reduce ambiguity in
Northern Ireland, there seems to be no corresponding inﬂuence on Palestine.19
6 General Results
In this section we present some more general results on the comparative statics of
changing ambiguity attitudes in 2-player games with strategic complements. We also
show that ambiguity can act to select equilibria in coordination games. In a game
with strategic complements and multiple Nash equilibria, if the level of pessimism
is suﬃciently high we can show that there is a unique equilibrium with ambiguity.
The equilibrium strategies will be less than those in the Pareto inferior equilibrium
without ambiguity. Optimism has the opposite eﬀect. We consider a game with 2-
players, i =1 ,2, where the strategy sets are subsets of the real line.20 In particular
let Si =[ mi,M i]f o ri =1 ,2a n dS = S1 × S2. Player i has utility function ui (s1,s 2)
and has beliefs on S−i represented by a neo-capacity νi = λi +( 1− λi − γi)πi.T h e
following assumption is maintained throughout this section.
Assumption 6.1 (Strict Concavity) There exists δ, such that for all s1,s 2 ∈
S,u11 (s1,s 2) <δ<0.
Proposition 6.1 If the amount of ambiguity perceived by player i, λi + γi is suﬃ-
ciently large the equilibrium with ambiguity is unique.
This result may be explained as follows. If player i believes player j’s behaviour
to be more ambiguous, player i’s behaviour becomes less responsive to changes in
19European integration rules out both the extreme Protestant claim that Ulster should have no
links whatsoever with Dublin and the extreme Nationalist case for a united Ireland with in which
the Great Britain plays no role. By focusing political debate on the middle ground it may help to
reduce ambiguity.
20This can be generalised to the case where the strategy sets are other ordered spaces, see Milgrom
and Roberts (1990).
32j’s strategy. Thus the reaction curves become steeper, which results in a unique
equilibrium.
Next we investigate the comparative statics of changing ambiguity attitudes. To
get unambiguous comparative static results we need to assume strategic complemen-
tarity.
Assumption 6.2 There are positive externalities,i . e . ui (si,s −i) is increasing in
s−i, for i =1 ,2.
Assumption 6.3 (Strategic Complementarity) ui
12 (s1,s 2) > 0, for i =1 ,2.21
Strategic complementarity says that if player j increases his/her strategy this
raises the marginal beneﬁtt oi of increasing his/her own strategy. If player i be-
comes more optimistic (s)he will place higher weight on good outcomes. If there are
positive externalities a good outcome will be interpreted as the opponent playing a
high strategy. In the presence of strategic complementarity this gives i an incentive
to increase his/her strategy. If equilibrium is unique, an increase in optimism will
increase equilibrium strategies of both players. If equilibrium is not unique we get a
similar result. The set of equilibria increases, in the sense that the strategies played
in the highest and lowest equilibria increase.
Proposition 6.2 Under Assumptions 6.2 and 6.3 the strategies of both players in
the highest and lowest equilibria are increasing (resp. decreasing) functions of λ1 and
λ2 (resp. γ1 and γ2).
Corollary 6.1 If λ1 (resp. γ1)i ss u ﬃciently large (resp. small), equilibrium is
unique and is larger (resp. smaller) than the largest (resp. smallest) equilibrium
without ambiguity.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 6.1 and 6.2.
21As usual u12 denotes
∂2u
∂s1∂s2.
33Thus ambiguity can act as an equilibrium selection device. If agents are suﬃ-
ciently optimistic, all will focus on an equilibrium in which high strategies are played.
The assumption of positive externalities and strategic complementarity implies that
the highest equilibrium is Pareto superior. In this case, optimism would select the
equilibrium with the highest level of economic activity. As usual, pessimism has the
opposite eﬀect.22
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
It is possible to generalise these applications in many ways. The applications here
were chosen to represent cases of strategic substitutes (Cournot equilibrium), strategic
complements with a unique equilibrium (Bertrand equilibrium) and strategic com-
plements with multiple equilibria (peace-making).
In Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) we study the comparative statics of uncertainty
in games with strategic substitutes or complements and ﬁnite strategy sets. In that
paper our results are proved for general pessimistic CEU preferences. This demon-
strates that the restriction to neo-capacities is not crucial for our results. That paper,
provides some further applications. In a model of voluntary contributions to pub-
lic goods we show that uncertainty increases the provision of public goods. This
potentially explains why donations often appear to be well above Nash equilibrium
levels. This frequently occurs in situations where there is much uncertainty, such as
an appeal to raise funds for disaster relief.
In a macroeconomic coordination model, we show that increasing ambiguity has
the eﬀect of reducing economic activity. If there are multiple equilibria, optimism
22Some related results can be found in Eichberger and Kelsey (2002). The present paper extends
those results since they apply to optimistic as well as pessimistic attitudes to ambiguity. In addition
the present paper has continuous rather than discrete strategy spaces. Eichberger and Kelsey (2002)
conﬁned attention to symmetric equilibria of symmetric games, assumptions not used in this section.
Moreover the earlier paper was only established uniqueness of equilibrium with a high degree of
ambiguity when a restrictive assumption was satisﬁed (Assumption 3.2 of Eichberger and Kelsey
(2002)).
34(resp. pessimism) can cause the economy to move to a higher (resp. lower) equi-
librium. This example could potentially be developed to provide macroeconomic
models with a Keynesian ﬂavour. It bears an intriguing resemblance to Keynes’ ar-
gument that macroeconomic activity is at times inﬂuenced by waves of optimism and
pessimism.
The economic applications, presented in this paper, can only serve to illustrate
the type of results which one can expect to obtain by including ambiguity in economic
analysis. Our intuition suggests that the conclusions obtained are not unreasonable.
So far, there exists experimental evidence only for the impact of ambiguity aversion
on individual decision making, Kilka and Weber (1998). Experimental results on
ambiguity in games, are to our knowledge not yet available. Indirect evidence, as in
Huck, Normann, and Oechseler (1999) for the Cournot case, provides some support
for our model.
This paper suggest a number of directions for future research. One, which we are
actively pursuing is experimental testing of the impact of ambiguity in games. The
theory in the present paper provides some testable hypotheses. One of these is that
ambiguity has the opposite eﬀect in games of strategic complements and substitutes.
This result should, in principle, be experimentally testable. An experiment could be
set up with matched pairs of games, which are as similar as possible, except than one
is a game of strategic complements and the other is a game of strategic substitutes.
If ambiguity is introduced into the two games then our theory predicts that it will
have the opposite eﬀect on equilibrium strategies.
35AA p p e n d i x
This appendix contains the proofs of those results not already proved in the text.
A.1 Games with Ambiguity
To see the eﬀect of ambiguity on behaviour in a game, it helps to consider the following
perturbation of the agents’ preferences. Let Vi (si,s −i;γi,λ i)=λi maxs−i∈S−i ui(si,s −i)+
γi mins−i∈S−i ui(si,s −i)+( 1− λi − γi)ui(si,s −i)f o ri =1 ,2. This perturbed payoﬀ
is just player i’s Choquet expected payoﬀ from the pure strategy proﬁle (si,s −i),
when player i’s beliefs may be represented by a neo-capacity with degrees of opti-
mism λi and pessimism γi. Now consider the following perturbed game Γ(λ,γ)=
(hI,(Si,V i (·;λi,γi)ii =1 ,2). The following result shows that an equilibrium with
uncertainty can be viewed as a conventional Nash equilibrium of this modiﬁed game.
Proposition A.1 For any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ(λ,γ), there is a cor-
responding pure strategy Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA) of Γ, in which player
i has degrees of optimism λi and pessimism γi.23
Proof. Let s∗ =( s∗
1,s ∗
2) be a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle of the game Γ(λ,γ)=
hI,(Si,V i (·;λi,γi),i=1 ,2i. Deﬁne a neo-capacity, ν∗
i, for i =1 ,2, by, ν∗
i = λi +
(1 − λi − γi)πi, where πi is the probability distribution that assigns probability 1 to
s∗
−i. The degree of uncertainty-aversion of ν∗
i is γi and suppν∗
i = suppπi. Hence,
suppν∗
i = {s∗
−i}. We assert that the proﬁle of neo capacities (ν∗
1,ν∗
2)i sa nEquilib-
rium under Ambiguity (EUA) of Γ. Since (s∗
1,s ∗




−i). The proﬁle of beliefs (ν∗
1,ν∗
2) is therefore an EUA.
An Equilibrium under Ambiguity of the game Γ(0,0,0,0) is a Nash equilibrium
of the game Γ. So a standard Nash equilibrium is the special case of an EUA where
23To clarify, by “corresponding” we mean that each player plays the same strategy in the two
equilibria.
36all players have additive beliefs. Moreover, EUA can be applied wherever Nash
equilibrium can, as Proposition 3.1 shows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 1 : By Proposition A.1, it suﬃces to show that a Nash
equilibrium of the game Γ(λ,γ)e x i s t s .O n ec a ns h o wVi(·;λi,γi) is continuous and
quasi-concave if ui(si,s −i) is continuous in s and quasi-concave in si. Existence of a
pure strategy equilibrium for Γ(λ,γ) then follows from standard arguments.
A.2 Oligopoly
Lemma A.1 Assume that the manager of ﬁrm 2 is ambiguity neutral (i.e. γ2 =
λ2 =0 ) , while the manager of ﬁrm 1 is not necessarily ambiguity neutral. Then
under Cournot quantity competition the equilibrium output of ﬁrm 1 is given by:
¯ x1 =
(1 − γ1 + λ1) − (1 + γ1 + λ1)c
3(1− γ1)+λ1
.
Proof. From equation (6), ﬁrm 1’s reaction function is given by, R1 (x2)=
(1−γ1)−(1−γ1−λ1)x2−c
2(1−γ1) .
By similar reasoning ﬁrm 2’s reaction function is, R2 (x1)=1−c−x1
2 . Solving for









4(1−γ1) from which the result follows.
.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 5 By equation (9), ﬁrm 2’s reaction function is given
by p2 =
a+bp1+ck
































from which the result follows.
Lemma A.2 Provided K > 10+9k
14 , in example 2 the optimal value of λ1 is
λ1 =
10 − 5k
56K − 38 − 37k
> 0. (11)
37Proof. By equation (10) ﬁrm 2’s reaction function is given by p2 =
2+p1+2k
4 .
Firm 1’s reaction function is given by p1 =
2+2k+λ1K+(1−λ)p2
4 . Solving for equilibrium,
p1 =
8+8k+4λ1K+(1−λ)(2+2k)













Proﬁt is maximised where this is equal to the price which would be chosen by




for λ1, 112 + 112k +5 6 λ1K +2 8( 1− λ1)(1+k) = 160 − 10(1 − λ1) + 144k −
9k(1 − λ1),56λ1,which implies K+38(1− λ1)+37(1− λ1)k =4 8+3 2 k ⇔ 56λK−
38λ1 − 37λ1k =1 0− 5k, from which equation (11) follows.




−38−37k =4 0+3 6 k −37k =2−k > 0,
since 2 = a>k .(Recall 10+9k
14 is the output a price leader would choose.)
A.3 Peace Processes
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . 1 Since b is convex, any party’s best response is either
si =0o rsi =1 .
Case (1) If s2 6=1 ,u(1,s 2) − u(s1,s 2)=aε(1 + s2)








1 +2 s2 − 2s1s2
¢
− c(1 − s1)=aε((1 + s1)(1− s1)+2 s2 (1 − s1)) −
c(1 − s1)=( 1− s1)[aε(1 + s1 +2 s2) − c] > 0, since, by assumption, aε > c.





= a(1 − 4ε)+4 aε − aε
¡
s2
1 +2 s1 +1
¢






−c(1 − s1)=a(1 − 4ε)+(1− s1)[2aε + aε(s1 +1 )− c] > 0s i n c eaε > c.
Case (2) To show that s1 = s2 = 1 is a Nash equilibrium, by convexity of b it
is enough to show u(1,1) > u(0,1). This holds since, u(1,1)−u(0,1) = a−c−aε =
a(1−ε)−c > 0. Now u(0,0) = 0,u(1,0) = aε −c 6 0, by assumption, which implies
that s1 = s2 = 0 is also a Nash equilibrium.
Case (3) If s1 6=1 ,u (0,s 2) − u(s1,s 2)=aεs2
2 − aε(s1 + s2)
2 + cs1





> c − 3aε > 0, since c>a (1 − ε)i m p l i e sc>3
4a > 3aε. The
38remaining case follows since u(1,1) − u(0,1) = a − c − aε = a(1 − ε) − c<0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . 2 Cases (1) and (3) are proven by Proposition 5.1 and
the observation that CEU preferences respect strict dominance.
Case ( 2 ) B yc o n v e x i t yt h eo n l yb e s tr e s p o n s e sc a nb e0o r1 .W i t h o u tl o s so f
generality consider player 1 Assume that his/her beliefs are represented by a neo-
capacity ν = λ +( 1− γ − λ)π. Let U (1) (resp. U (0)) denote his/her (Choquet)
expected utility if (s)he chooses 1 (resp. 0). Then, U (1) = λ[a − c]+γ [aε − c]+
(1 − γ − λ)
h
aεEπ (1 + s2)
2 − c
i
,U(0) = λaε +( 1− γ − λ)aεEπs2
2, where Eπ de-
notes expectation with respect to the additive probability π. Now U (1) − U (0) =
λ[a − c]+γ [aε − c]+( 1− γ − λ)
h
aεEπ (1 + s2)
2 − c
i
− λaε − (1 − γ − λ)aεEπs2
2
= λ[a(1 − ε) − c]+γ [aε − c]+( 1− γ − λ)[aεEπ (1 + 2s2) − c]. By assumption
[a(1 − ε) − c] > 0a n daε−c<0 hence if λ (resp. γ)i ss u ﬃciently large U (1) >U(0)
(resp. U (1) <U(0)), from which the result follows.
A.4 General Results
Lemma A.3 The slope of the reaction functions is given by
R10 (s2)=






11 (R1 (s2),M 2)+γ1u1
11 (R1 (s2),m 2)+( 1− λ1 − γ1)u1
11 (R1 (s2),s 2)
R20 (s1)=






22 (M1,R 2 (s1)) + γ2u2
22 (m1,R 2 (s1)) + (1 − λ2 − γ2)u2
22 (s1,R 2 (s1))
.
Proof. Let Ri denote the reaction function of player i. Consider player 1, his/her
Choquet expected utility is given by: λ1u1 (s1,M 2)+γ1u1 (s1,m 2)+(1 − λ1 − γ1)u1 (s1,s 2).







































=0 . From which the result follows. The slope of R2
can be derived by similar reasoning.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . 1 Consider the function,g : S1 × S2 → S1 × S2,
deﬁned by g(s1,s 2)=
­
R1 (s2) − s1,R 2 (s1) − s2
®




∂s2 = R10 (s2),
∂g2
∂s1 = R20 (s1)a n d
∂g2
∂s2 = −1. Let J denote the Jacobian








. The trace of J is −2. Thus if the de-
terminant of J is positive, both eigenvalues must be negative and hence J is negative














where Q =m a x hs1,s2i∈S
¯ ¯u1
12 (s1,s 2)
¯ ¯. It follows that J is negative deﬁnite if λ1 + γ1
is suﬃciently large. By Theorem 4.3 of Eichberger (1993), negative deﬁniteness of J
is implies that equilibrium is unique.
The next result characterises the highest and lowest equilibria in terms of the
slope of the reaction functions.
Lemma A.4 If the highest and lowest equilibria are interior equilibria, then
R10 (s2)R20 (s1) 6 1 at these equilibria.




there are no corner equilibria, hence ρ(m1) >m 1 and ρ(M1) <M 1. Let hˆ s1, ˆ s2i be
an equilibrium such that R10 (s2)R20 (s1) > 1. Then for all suﬃciently small δ>0,
ρ(ˆ s1 + δ) > ˆ s1 + δ.L e tφ(s1)=ρ(s1) − s1. Then φ(s1 + δ) > 0a n dφ(M1) < 0. By
the intermediate value theorem there exists ¯ s ∈ (ˆ s1 + δ,M1) such that φ(¯ s1)=¯ s1.
Therefore hˆ s1, ˆ s2i is not the highest equilibrium. A similar argument applies to the
lowest equilibrium.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . 2 Let hˆ s1, ˆ s2i denote the highest equilibrium. Assume
ﬁrst that hˆ s1, ˆ s2i is an interior equilibrium. Since hˆ s1, ˆ s2i is an interior equilibrium it
40satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions for best responses.
λ1u1
1 (s1,M 2)+γ1u1
1 (s1,m 2)+( 1− λ1 − γ1)u1
1 (s1,s 2)=0 , (13)
λ2u2
2 (M1,s 2)+γ2u2
2 (m1,s 2)+( 1− λ2 − γ2)u2
2 (s1,s 2)=0 . (14)




22 (m1,s 2)+( 1− λ2 − γ2)u2
22 (s1,s 2)
¤ ∂s2
∂λ1+(1 − λ2 − γ2)u2













11 (s1,m 2)+( 1− λ1 − γ1)u1
11 (s1,s 2)
¤ ∂s1
∂λ1+(1 − λ1 − γ1)u1
12 (s1,s 2) ∂s2
∂λ1
= u1



















11(s1,s2)]. Substituting from (15),
∂s1


















1 − R10 (s2)R20 (s1)
¤−1 . By Lemma A.4,
1 − R10 (s2)R20 (s1) > 0, hence ∂s1
∂λ1 > 0. By equation (15) ∂s2
∂λ1 > 0. The results for
the eﬀect of changing the other parameters on the highest and lowest equilibria can
be obtained by similar reasoning.
Now consider the case where the highest equilibrium is on the boundary of the
strategy set. In particular suppose that when λ1 = ˜ λ1 that the highest equilibrium
is hM1,M 2i. Firstly it is trivially true that a decrease in λ1 must (weakly) decrease
the equilibrium strategies of both players. Now suppose λ1 increases from ˜ λ1 to ˆ λ1.





1 − ˜ λ1 − γ1
´
u1
1 (M1,M 2) > 0, (16)
λ2u2
1 (M1,M 2)+γ2u2
1 (m1,M 2)+( 1− λ2 − γ2)u2





1 − ˆ λ1 − γ1
´
u1





1 − ˜ λ1 − γ1
´
u1
1 (M1,M 2), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are still sat-
isﬁed when λ1 = ˆ λ1. By concavity, these conditions are suﬃcient hence hM1,M 2i re-
mains the highest equilibrium when λ1 = ˆ λ1. Similar reasoning applies to the lowest
equilibrium.
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